Special prosecutors say Hong ordered martial law opinion monitoring and directed support for special forces; both defendants reject the charges and contest the indictments themselves
Hong Jang-won, the former first deputy director of the National Intelligence Service who had been regarded as a whistleblower in the Dec. 3, 2024, emergency martial law crisis, and Col. Cho Sung-hyun, the former commander of the Capital Defense Command's 1st Security Regiment known for the so-called "Seogangdaegyo retreat," have both been indicted by the second comprehensive special prosecutor's office led by Special Prosecutor Kwon Chang-young, making them defendants in a criminal case. Both men strongly deny the charges and argue the indictments themselves are unjust. Fierce legal battles are expected in court.
According to legal sources Saturday, the Seoul Central District Court's Criminal Division 38-2, presided over by Judges Jeong Su-yeong, Choi Yeong-gak and Jang Jeong-jin, will hold the first pretrial hearing in Hong's case — in which he is charged with participating in insurrection and violating the NIS Act — at 11 a.m. on Sept. 30. As a pretrial hearing does not require the defendant's presence, Hong is not obligated to appear in court.
Hong had been treated as a witness, not a suspect, during the investigation by the first insurrection special prosecutor's office led by Special Prosecutor Jo Eun-seok last year — in part because he had exposed the so-called "arrest list" of politicians during the Dec. 3 emergency martial law. The current special prosecutor's office, however, concluded that Hong participated in the insurrection and indicted him on charges of performing an important role in insurrection, along with former NIS Director Jo Tae-yong, former second deputy director Hwang Won-jin and former planning and coordination chief Kim Nam-woo.
The charges against Hong allege that he received orders to carry out martial law from former President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Director Jo, then relayed those orders to subordinate units through a meeting of department heads. Prosecutors say he directed those units to establish contact networks with the Defense Counterintelligence Command and the Korean National Police Agency, dispatch personnel to the police agency's operations center, and collect unusual public opinion related to martial law.
The most contentious legal battle is expected to center first on whether Hong actually received and acted on orders from Yoon and Jo. While the special prosecutor's office concluded he did, Hong's side argues that the indictments of co-defendants Hwang and Kim reveal the existence of a separate chain of command — making the allegation against Hong internally contradictory.
Above all, Hong's side maintains that he never accepted the goal of undermining the constitutional order. According to his indictment, at around 10:53 p.m. on Dec. 3, 2024 — after martial law had been declared — Hong received a call on a secure line from Yoon, who told him to "round them all up" and "help the Defense Counterintelligence Command first." At around 11:06 p.m. the same night, Hong spoke by phone with former Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong and wrote down a "list of arrest targets" that Yeo dictated to him.
Hong's side argues that at around 11:47 p.m. that night, Yoon separately directed Kim, the former planning chief, to compile a list of personnel to be dispatched to the martial law command. They say this shows Yoon recognized Hong was not following through and turned to Kim — a former subordinate from his prosecutorial career — as an alternative channel to execute martial law tasks.
Hong's side also stresses that if he had intended to carry out Yoon's orders, there would have been no reason to separately request guidance from Director Jo in a private meeting. They argue that Hong's decision to seek guidance from Jo rather than act on his own — and his failure to issue specific martial law implementation instructions at the department heads' meeting — together indicate that he did not comply with the orders.
Hong's side also disputes the special prosecutor's finding that he directed subordinate units to carry out martial law. Prosecutors allege that at the department heads' meeting, Hong told the heads of the cognitive warfare and open-source intelligence units to "collect unusual public opinion related to martial law on SNS and other platforms," and included this in the indictment.
Hong's side counters that the cognitive warfare unit's core mission is to monitor SNS and other platforms for harmful information, meaning the activity amounted to routine monitoring with no specific intervention. They say Hong merely emphasized that the open-source and cognitive warfare units should coordinate and share work appropriately — as they normally would — and that no concrete action beyond standard monitoring took place.
Hong also denies ordering the establishment of a contact network with the Defense Counterintelligence Command. His side argues there was no need to issue such an order — and that he did not — given that he already had direct phone access to former Commander Yeo and that counterintelligence personnel were already stationed at the NIS's Counterintelligence Information Sharing Center. He says the intent was simply to suggest including a note in a report to the director about maintaining good communication with agencies already present at the center.
On the allegation that he ordered the dispatch of personnel to the police agency's operations center, Hong says the position for a police liaison officer at the NIS counterterrorism unit's operations center had been vacant for more than a year, and that he had merely asked what should be done about it. He contends that as this question was passed down through the ranks, it was distorted into an order to "dispatch personnel to the police agency's operations center."
Col. Cho, who drew public attention for reportedly ordering his troops not to cross Seogangdaegyo bridge during the martial law crisis — an episode known as the "Seogangdaegyo retreat" — also faces a fierce legal battle with the special prosecutor's office in the trials ahead.
The Seoul Central District Court's Criminal Division 38-1, presided over by Judges Jang Seong-jin, Jeong Su-yeong and Choi Yeong-gak, will hold the first pretrial hearing in Cho's case — in which he is charged with performing an important role in insurrection — on Oct. 2. The first insurrection special prosecutor's office had previously decided not to open a case against Cho, finding insufficient grounds to charge him.
The current special prosecutor's office alleges that Cho received orders from former Capital Defense Command chief Lee Jin-woo at around 12:43 a.m. on Dec. 4, 2024, to "control access to the National Assembly and drag out the lawmakers," and then deployed troops from units under the 1st Security Regiment into the National Assembly building — regardless of the Assembly's wishes — to neutralize it, constituting an act of insurrection aimed at undermining the constitutional order.
Cho maintains that he had no awareness, even in the most incidental sense, of any intent to undermine the constitutional order before emergency martial law was declared. He says he recognized the unlawfulness of the orders only after Lee directed him to "drag out the lawmakers," and argues that everything he did after that point did not meaningfully contribute to the insurrection — but rather constituted acts of obstruction, delay and deliberate slowdown that protected his troops from a dangerous situation and helped bring the crisis to an early end.
Cho's side says that when Lee ordered him at around 10:45 p.m. on Dec. 3 to head to the National Assembly because "there's a situation there," no intent to undermine the constitutional order was expressed, and Cho had no way of knowing one existed. They also stress that the mission was consistent with the 1st Security Regiment's mandate, which includes providing security support for key national facilities.
The special prosecutor's office also alleges that Cho ordered his subordinate units to support the Army Special Warfare Command. Cho denies this, saying his words — "find out what the situation is" — were directed at his troops already on the ground, and that any collaboration was contingent on first assessing the situation, not a standing order to cooperate. He argues this does not constitute insurrection conspiracy.
Most significantly, Cho says that after recognizing the unlawfulness of Lee's order to drag out lawmakers, he halted his subordinate units at the northern end of Seogangdaegyo at around 1:20 a.m. on Dec. 4 to prevent them from entering the National Assembly grounds, and immediately ordered them to turn back when some units moved there by mistake — affirming that the "Seogangdaegyo retreat" did in fact occur.
The special prosecutor's office pushed back at a final investigation briefing Friday after completing six months of inquiry. "The claim that he ordered troops not to cross Seogangdaegyo is exaggerated," prosecutors said. "He in fact issued a clear order to enter the National Assembly and remove people from inside."
Against this backdrop, recent not-guilty verdicts handed down to two other defendants charged with performing an important role in insurrection have drawn attention. Park Heon-su, former head of the Defense Ministry's investigation bureau, and Ko Dong-hui, former planning chief of the Defense Intelligence Command, were each acquitted. Park had been indicted on charges including organizing investigation bureau personnel to be sent to the Defense Counterintelligence Command during the martial law crisis. Ko was indicted on charges of participating in a plan to occupy the National Election Commission and arrest its staff.
The Seoul Central District Court's Criminal Division 37-2, presided over by Judges Oh Chang-seop, Ryu Chang-seong and Jang Seong-hun, acquitted Park on Thursday, stating: "We examined individually whether there was intent to undermine the constitutional order, whether there was awareness of unlawfulness, and whether the conduct constituted performing an important role in insurrection. We find it difficult to conclude that he shared the intent or awareness to neutralize the National Assembly or undermine the basic constitutional order, or that he participated in the insurrection by cooperating with the Defense Counterintelligence Command's requests."
In acquitting Ko, the court said: "He was not aware in advance that martial law would be declared, and received orders to carry out his mission immediately after the declaration while already deployed in the field, leaving him with insufficient information to assess the legality of the martial law. It appears he did not believe his assigned mission would suspend the functions of the National Election Commission. It is difficult to conclude that he recognized he was carrying out his mission with the intent to undermine the constitutional order."
bell@heraldcorp.com