The recent rise of South Korea's defense industry has been remarkable. From tanks and self-propelled artillery to missiles, aircraft and warships, Korean weapons systems are earning high marks in global markets. Yet the industry cannot afford to rest on its current success. For K-defense to grow into a sustainable national core industry, the focus must shift from how many finished products can be exported to how strong a defense ecosystem can be built. The first priority is rebuilding the supply chain needed to advance weapons systems. Cutting-edge weapons require rare earth elements, rare metals, high-purity materials and semiconductors. For South Korea, a country poor in natural resources, shifts in the international order or resource controls imposed by specific countries can quickly translate into production risks for the defense sector. Defense exports and resource security must therefore be bound together as a single strategy. When selling weapons to countries that hold strategic resources — rare earths, copper, tungsten, lithium — South Korea should use strategic countertrade arrangements to secure long-term resource supply rights and joint development opportunities. Existing offset agreements should also evolve beyond technology transfers and local production into "resource offsets" that lock in access to the partner country's strategic materials. The hardware base must be broadened as well. A truly powerful defense nation is not simply one that excels at assembling finished products. Research and development investment in advanced components — sensors, radar, semiconductors, electro-optics, communications, engines and specialty materials — must be expanded, and the barriers keeping small and medium-sized enterprises, venture firms, universities and research institutes out of the defense sector must be decisively lowered. Software matters even more. The outcome of future warfare will be decided by AI, data, software and command-and-control systems. Relying on foreign technology for these capabilities cannot be called true defense self-reliance. South Korea must build a "sovereign defense" AI and software system it controls entirely on its own, connecting defense AI, battlefield data, command-and-control networks (C4I), cloud infrastructure and cybersecurity into a single integrated ecosystem with its weapons systems. The export model must change as well. Rather than selling weapons alone, South Korea should export a full package: weapons systems plus AI and command-and-control, education and training, logistics support, maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), and continuous performance upgrades. I call this the "K-defense chain" — a strategy that links hardware and software, defense exports and resource acquisition, local production and MRO, and performance upgrades with follow-on weapons procurement. Ultimately, it is a strategy that turns a single export contract into a 30-year market. Achieving this requires pan-government prioritization and focus. A national strategy to expand the K-defense base — one that brings together not only the Ministry of National Defense and the Defense Acquisition Program Administration but also the industry, science and technology, and diplomacy sectors alongside companies, universities and research institutes — must be drawn up without delay. The Ministry of National Defense in particular must make a clear-eyed judgment about the priorities of the era. The world is locked in fierce competition over AI, unmanned systems, space, cyber capabilities and critical minerals. At such a moment, administrative energy and public attention should not be squandered on unproductive debates such as the integration of military academies. The ministry must direct its full capacity toward deciding what will sustain South Korea's military strength and defense industry over the next 20 to 30 years. If the first act of K-defense was the miracle of building excellent weapons, the second act must be the challenge of connecting and leading the global defense ecosystem. South Korea must leap beyond being a country that sells finished products to one that exports supply chains, technology, software and MRO alongside them. Now is the time to build the K-defense chain. Chae Woo-seok is chairman of the Korea Defense Industry Association.

A serious question demands an answer: Where does Korea's robot industry stand today, and where is it going? The 2026 World Robot Conference (WRC), the world's largest robot festival, ran in Beijing from Aug. 19 to Aug. 23. Co-organized by the Chinese Institute of Electronics and the World Robot Cooperation Organization, the event has grown well beyond a simple technology exhibition into a large-scale convergence platform encompassing forums, displays and competitions. The global robot industry on show there was innovating at a pace that exceeded all expectations. Most striking was the remarkable progress of humanoid robots. Having moved past the stage of merely walking or carrying objects, service-oriented humanoid robots equipped with emotion-recognition and interactive capabilities were engaging with the public in an approachable way. It was clear that humanoid robots have evolved beyond the general-purpose technology phase and are rapidly advancing toward practical deployment across specific industries — homes, factories, logistics and services. Industrial robots performed precision micro-processes faster and more accurately than ever in ultra-precise assembly, welding and machining automation. Smart logistics systems centered on autonomous mobile robots and automated guided vehicles evolved into hybrid AMR configurations integrated with humanoid robots, pushing logistics automation to new levels of completeness. Medical and healthcare robots spanning surgery, rehabilitation, nursing and elderly care are also working their way deeper into daily life. A comprehensive ecosystem of hardware components — actuators, sensors and machine vision systems — was on display under one roof. Witnessing the world's finest robot technologies from more than 1,240 exhibiting companies left me with feelings more complicated than mere alarm. As someone working in the same industry, I came away with four observations about what Korea's robot sector must do to survive and advance in this intensely competitive landscape. First, broaden the base of robots as culture, not just industry. The point is to make robots familiar and accessible to the general public. From the moment I joined the queue at the exhibition entrance, I was struck by interest in robots cutting across every age group — children, the elderly and everyone in between. WRC felt less like an industry event and more like a national festival. Unlike Korea, where interest in robotics depends largely on those already working in the field, China has built a cultural foundation in which society as a whole takes an interest in and feels affection for robot technology. This is a reminder that Korea needs to cultivate a "K-robot culture" — one that lets the public experience robots in everyday life and feel close to them. Walking a robot dog, listening to music, laughing and enjoying time with a humanoid robot — these are not scenes from the future. They are already reality abroad. Second, nurture talent defined by knowledge and capability, not just numbers. Korea has established and is implementing roadmaps across AI, robotics and semiconductors. Achieving genuine results will require structural changes in how talent is developed. Autonomy must be guaranteed for schools, research institutions and companies receiving government support — but that autonomy must be backed by tangible outcomes if it is to create the virtuous cycle that drives growth across the entire robotics ecosystem. Specifically, two types of talent are needed. One is a hardware-software convergence specialist capable of operating ROS2- and Linux-based robot operating systems, implementing control algorithms, designing high-density mechatronics suited to humanoid robots, analyzing the kinematics and dynamics of multi-joint robots, and handling thermal management and durability-focused structural design. The other is an AI specialist versed in reinforcement learning-based motion control, reasoning based on vision-language models and large language models, multimodal perception, and physical AI dynamics modeling. Robots and AI are incomplete without each other. The two talent pools must be brought together to research and grow on a single platform. Third, Korea needs a bold expansion of its global cooperation network. Domestic robot policy has until now placed excessive weight on development while remaining relatively passive about cooperating with global institutions in core materials, components, modules and software. Given the gap that currently exists between Korea and leading nations, multifaceted cooperation with pioneering institutions and companies in the United States, China and Japan is not optional — it is essential. The government must also offer far more generous support and incentives to domestic companies that actively participate in global supply chains and partner with overseas institutions. Nurturing domestic companies matters, but support that comes too late is not investment — it is waste. Expanding through global cooperation, growing the technology and industry base, and achieving economies of scale are the most urgent priorities for Korea's robot industry right now. Fourth, a deployment strategy for a field-ready "Korean-style humanoid robot" is also needed. Deploying humanoid robots directly and comprehensively on manufacturing floors still faces technological and cost constraints. The realistic path is to integrate humanoid robots with existing automation equipment and allow them to gradually take over some of the tasks currently handled by industrial robots. The field data accumulated through that process should then serve as the foundation for evolving toward fully autonomous humanoid robots — expanding from single tasks to complex ones, and ultimately to manufacturing-specialized humanoid robots capable of independently assessing conditions on the floor. There is no need to despair over other countries' robot ambitions. Korea may lag behind some nations in the foundational humanoid market, but it possesses a world-class manufacturing base along with outstanding process management systems such as manufacturing execution systems (MES) and warehouse management systems (WMS). When those strengths are linked with humanoid robots, the competitive advantage becomes formidable. Korea's manufacturing robot density is in fact the highest in the world at 1,220 units per 10,000 workers, according to the International Federation of Robotics' World Robotics 2025 report. That means Korea leads the world in the capacity to put robots to work. It will likely take a few more years before humanoid robots become fixtures on factory floors, in homes and across the service industry. Put another way, Korea still has time to prove its robot competitiveness. But it cannot afford to wait. Robots are no longer a technology of the future. They are a core growth engine that will determine national competitiveness. A clear policy direction from the government, bold ambition and cooperation from industry, and genuine public interest can make Korea a robot powerhouse.

The semiconductor boom has set the stage for record-breaking bonus payouts at major conglomerates. National tax revenue in the first half of this year is projected to rise 33 trillion won ($23.5 billion), or 17.4 percent, from a year earlier. Beyond semiconductors, power equipment and HVAC companies have also seen their earnings swell. Much of this windfall traces back to aggressive AI data center investment by US hyperscalers locked in a race for AI dominance. The enormous spoils have drawn the attention of every corporate stakeholder group, with employees and government ministries each making little secret of their competing calculations. Left out of this feast, however, are the dozens to thousands of small and medium-sized materials, parts and equipment suppliers embedded in semiconductor, robotics and power supply chains. When excess profits materialize, executives and employees at large conglomerates collect performance bonuses, the government enjoys a surge in tax revenue, shareholders receive higher dividends, and local communities and consumers see some benefit as well. The contribution of supplier firms deserves recognition too. They operate in ordinary commercial relationships with parent companies — receiving payment in exchange for goods — but those relationships are sustained over long periods, creating a special interdependence. That sustained tie gives rise to a legitimate claim to compensation beyond the contract price, tied to the parent company's excess profits. Global competition is no longer a contest between individual firms; it has become a contest between supply chains and ecosystems. The outcome of the coming AI revolution will be decided not by one or two large conglomerates but by the quality of the ecosystem as a whole. The government's three mega-projects — 800 trillion won for semiconductors, 550 trillion won for data centers and more — have signaled over 1,500 trillion won in investment over the next decade. Yet semiconductors, physical AI and data centers are not isolated islands. That investment can translate into productivity and competitiveness only when materials, parts and equipment suppliers, along with power equipment, cooling systems, robot sensor and software companies, are connected through evenly developed capabilities. Sustaining the gains of the AI revolution as broad-based national economic growth for future generations will require the trickle-down effect of large conglomerates' performance to actually reach the wider ecosystem. The problem is that trickle-down is slow, and channels must be actively opened. For the time being, distributing large conglomerates' excess profits to contributors within the related ecosystem is not straightforward. Collective resistance from shareholders and employees is to be expected. At a minimum, excess tax revenue could be put to meaningful use as "patient capital" — directed at materials, parts and equipment firms in semiconductors, AI and robotics, particularly technology-focused small and medium-sized enterprises. Such suppliers must commit enormous capital to research and development, equipment and personnel well before orders arrive from large conglomerates. That leaves them chronically strained in terms of capital strength, liquidity and creditworthiness. Loan delinquency rates offer a telling indicator of this strain. As of the end of May this year, the delinquency rate on commercial bank loans to small and medium-sized enterprises stood at 1.00 percent, the highest in 11 years — nearly four times the 0.27 percent rate for large-company loans. Financial institutions can be expected to tighten their risk management further in response. A promising mechanism exists for channeling patient capital to technology firms: policy guarantees. Unlike direct subsidies, policy guarantees strengthen a company's creditworthiness to attract private funding. Institutions such as the Korea Technology Finance Corp., the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund and regional credit guarantee foundations play exactly this role. When excess tax revenue flows to policy guarantee institutions, their funds are reinforced. Excess profits from large conglomerates could also be channeled into those funds in the form of donations. Policy guarantees are generally analyzed to carry a multiplier effect of close to tenfold. "When assessments focus primarily on financial condition, technology firms have very few options for improving their liquidity," a venture industry official said. "Evaluating technological and business viability as the basis for guarantees is a realistic way to build patient capital and let the trickle-down effect of excess profits reach supplier firms as well."