US-Korea shipbuilding cooperation has moved beyond summit declarations and MOUs into the implementation phase. The Korea-US Shipbuilding Partnership Center (KUSPC) has launched in Washington, D.C., and the $150 billion MASGA initiative has begun to take shape in earnest. The question now is no longer whether the will to cooperate exists, but whether that will can be translated into tangible results — actual ship production, shipyard modernization, workforce development and supply chain construction.
Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick's message was unambiguous. He made clear that US-Korea shipbuilding cooperation would be measured not by the number of meetings or MOUs signed, but by capital invested, facilities modernized, workers trained, supply chains built and ships actually produced in the United States. He also pledged support in removing the regulatory barriers Korean companies face when building vessels in the US. What America is asking for is not words — it is ships. For Korea, that is both a pressure and an opportunity.
Movement has also begun in what had long been the most uncertain arena: the US Congress. Staff members from the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee recently visited HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean and Samsung Heavy Industries to assess South Korea's warship-building capabilities firsthand. They toured Aegis destroyers, frigates and submarines, and received briefings on shipbuilding capacity including replenishment vessels. The fact that congressional staffers who handle the US defense budget traveled directly to Korean shipyards signals that Congress, following the executive branch's lead, has begun verifying the actual capabilities of Korea's shipbuilding industry.
Legislative changes are also taking shape. Title 10, Section 8679 of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 8679) generally prohibits the construction of US military vessels and their major hull and superstructure components at foreign shipyards. Even when the president grants a national security waiver, the law requires congressional notification and a 30-day waiting period.
However, the fiscal year 2027 defense appropriations bill passed by the House Appropriations Committee proposes narrowing the scope of restrictions on overseas construction — from the previously broad category of naval vessels to "covered ships" defined as combat forces. While this does not open the door to all overseas construction, it creates the potential for greater budgetary flexibility to use allied shipyards for non-combat support vessels and similar craft.
The Senate Armed Services Committee's fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act proposal similarly allows for limited procurement of bulk fuel ships and strategic sealift vessels from foreign shipyards, while requiring participating companies to invest in the US maritime industrial base and bring subsequent production and supply chains back to American soil.
In short, the Senate is moving to crack open the door to limited procurement from allied shipyards, while the House Appropriations Committee is working to lower the budgetary threshold that has blocked overseas construction in non-combat areas. Neither chamber has passed final legislation, and the core prohibition of 10 U.S.C. § 8679 remains in place. But a structural opening has clearly begun to appear in what was once a nearly closed door.
This moment matters for Korea. What the United States wants is not Korea's shipbuilding reputation — it is the restoration of American shipbuilding production capacity. Korea's argument, therefore, must not be "we will build US warships in Korea's place." It must be: "Korea will help restore the shipyards, workforce, supply chains and production technology that will allow America to build more of its own warships again." Only with that framing will the US Congress accept the use of allied shipbuilding capacity not as something that strips away American jobs and industrial base, but as something that rebuilds them.
The role of Korean shipyards must be designed with this in mind. The ultimate destination is the United States. However, it will take time for American production facilities — including Philly Shipyard — to develop sufficient capacity. A bridge model, in which Korean shipyards temporarily fill that gap, needs to be negotiated. The approach would be to launch limited pilot programs with non-combat vessels such as bulk fuel ships and strategic sealift vessels, demonstrating delivery timelines, quality, cost management, security and supply chain capabilities. Rather than demanding full authorization for overseas construction of combat vessels from the outset, carving out legal and budgetary exceptions for such pilot programs is the more realistic path.
If domestic Korean construction buys time, US-based investment must be the work that converts that time into production capacity. Philly Shipyard, acquired by Hanwha, is one of the central platforms for that effort. The goal is to transfer Korea's design expertise, block and module construction, process and schedule management, quality control, automation and workforce development capabilities to American soil — transforming the yard into one capable of building more warships on its own.
Hanwha's investment in Philly Shipyard, HD Hyundai's cooperation with US shipbuilding and technology firms, and Samsung Heavy Industries' collaboration on unmanned surface vessels and workforce training must all be viewed as part of the same picture. KUSPC, too, must be more than a liaison office — it must serve as a platform connecting this transfer of capabilities. Joint research and development must lead to productivity innovation; workforce training must translate into a skilled labor pool; and supply chain cooperation must result in the restoration of a domestic equipment and components ecosystem within the United States.
US-Korea naval vessel cooperation also requires a sequenced approach. The first step is to convert the limited overseas procurement and budgetary deregulation movements emerging in both chambers into actual policy, establishing a precedent for using allied shipbuilding capacity with non-combat auxiliary vessels and strategic sealift ships. The second step, during that period, is to build up the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), module production and auxiliary vessel construction capabilities at US yards including Philly Shipyard. The third step is to establish a joint production framework combining US-Korea co-design, module and block supply, and final assembly in the United States. Only after sufficient track record and trust have been built should the question of expanding joint construction to combat support ships and surface combatants be considered.
The road to combat vessels does not begin with combat vessels. Building a track record with auxiliary ships and growing production capacity inside the United States must come first.
The recent visit by House Appropriations defense subcommittee staff should be understood in that light. The fact that they toured Korea's Aegis destroyers, frigates and submarines does not mean Congress has approved Korean construction of US combat vessels. But the sequence of developments — the administration's requests for information, President Donald Trump and Commerce Secretary Lutnick's stated commitment to shipbuilding cooperation, legislative movement in both chambers, and now on-the-ground verification by congressional staff — represents clear progress. Political signals, working-level review and legislative momentum are beginning to converge in the same direction.
Over the long term, this shipbuilding cooperation could also serve as a foundation of strategic trust that advances discussions on nuclear-powered submarines for Korea. However, it must not become a transaction in which Korea demands submarine technology in exchange for helping build US warships. Nuclear-powered submarines must be addressed separately, within the distinct frameworks of nuclear nonproliferation, technology transfer and alliance strategy. That said, if Korea becomes a trusted core partner in rebuilding the US shipbuilding industry and naval power, it could positively shape the strategic environment in which the United States views the strengthening of Korea's undersea warfare capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
The United States is now asking for ships, not words. In Congress, moves have begun to widen the institutional space for using allied shipbuilding capacity to produce those ships. What Korea must do is not force the door open. It is to build a track record with auxiliary vessels, grow shipyards, workforce and supply chains inside the United States, and give the US Congress the justification it needs to open the next door itself.
Domestic Korean shipyards should serve as a temporary bridge; US yards including Philly Shipyard should become the long-term production base; and auxiliary vessels should serve as the institutional stepping stone toward combat ships. The door that has opened is still a small one. But if designed correctly, it can become a passage that deepens the US-Korea maritime security alliance far beyond shipbuilding cooperation alone.
Lee Ki-sik is a former commissioner of the Military Manpower Administration and former commander of Naval Operations.
shindw@heraldcorp.com
