Four military commanders have been referred to prosecutors after a soldier in his 20s died of heatstroke during a unit marathon held in scorching heat with no adequate safety measures in place.
The Gyeonggi Northern Police Agency's wide-area crime investigation unit said Saturday it had referred four military commanders from the unit — including the division commander — to prosecutors without detention on charges of professional negligence resulting in death.
According to authorities, the Army's 8th Division planned the event last year to commemorate the Battle of Yeongcheon, a Korean War victory. The race, covering 9.13 kilometers, was scheduled around Sept. 13, the anniversary of that battle.
Units were offered commendations based on participation and completion rates. Among those who took part was Pvt. Ji Su-hyeok, a cook four months into his military service, assigned to a subordinate brigade.
The race was held along the Pocheon Stream on Sept. 5. Temperatures that day reached a high of 31 degrees Celsius, and humidity hovered around 70 percent after rain fell the previous Friday — conditions that made running particularly grueling.
Ji collapsed near the 8-kilometer mark after struggling through the course. He was taken to a hospital but died from organ failure caused by heatstroke.
The investigation found serious deficiencies in how the event was planned and run.
Notably, the military had not conducted a "risk assessment" — a standard procedure for identifying and preparing for hazards before training or operations.
Despite the marathon being a first-of-its-kind event rather than routine training, commanders had not specifically anticipated or prepared for risks such as medical emergencies or traffic accidents.
In place of a proper risk assessment, the division issued only cursory guidelines to subordinate units, including directives to "secure emergency medical support," "form buddy pairs of similar fitness levels" and "conduct gradual practice runs."
Even those minimal measures were not followed. There was no procedure to assess whether participants had the fitness or experience to run 9 kilometers, and the guidelines were issued so close to the event that gradual practice was effectively impossible.
As a cook, Ji was frequently excluded from field training, and even during the physical fitness time built into a regular soldier's daily schedule, he was occupied with meal preparation — leaving him with little opportunity to build his fitness.
Ji's daily routine left almost no time or mental space to prepare for a 9-kilometer run days away. He rose at 6 a.m. to prepare breakfast, began lunch preparations at 10:30 a.m., started dinner preparations at 4 p.m. and cleaned up before lights out, with barely a moment to rest in between.
The entirety of Ji's "gradual practice" amounted to a single roughly 4-kilometer run on the parade ground shortly before the event.
On the day of the race, Ji had to join the competition immediately after waking at 5:30 a.m. and completing breakfast preparations and cleanup by 7 a.m.
The requirement to pair soldiers of similar fitness levels was also ignored.
The two soldiers who ran at a similar pace alongside Ji were a senior enlisted soldier and a noncommissioned officer, both of whom far surpassed him in fitness and running experience.
Running alongside superiors in better physical condition likely placed Ji under psychological pressure rather than offering him support, investigators said.
The inadequate planning translated into inadequate response on the ground.
On the day of the race, the unit's medical officer was absent from the course entirely, citing an off-duty rest period following overnight duty, while the nursing officer was participating in the race.
When Ji collapsed, he was transported to the hospital not in a 119 ambulance or a hospital vehicle equipped with medical gear, but in a military Korando vehicle that happened to be nearby.
The first hospital was unable to treat heatstroke and transferred him to a secondary facility — a process during which the critical window for treatment passed.
The case was initially handled by military investigators before being transferred to police.
Military authorities acknowledged negligence and referred two commanders — one field-grade officer and one company-grade officer — to police.
However, the division commander and other senior commanders who originally planned and ordered the event were excluded from the referral, drawing criticism.
Ji's family responded by filing their own complaints against the division commander, who had been left off the referral list, as well as the senior soldier and noncommissioned officer who had run alongside Ji.
Police concluded that the division commander bore responsibility as well, applied charges of professional negligence resulting in death and referred a total of four people to prosecutors.
"Military regulations required a risk assessment to be conducted and supervisory oversight to be maintained — and it was found that those obligations were not fulfilled," a police official said, explaining the referral decision.
However, police decided not to refer the senior soldier and the noncommissioned officer, saying they had neither authority nor responsibility over the event and that their actions at the time of the accident could not be considered legally problematic.
Ji's family expressed frustration with that decision. "The victim likely could not stop running despite reaching his physical limit, given the influence of the senior soldiers running alongside him — so it is regrettable that they face no legal responsibility," the family said.
"The unjust death of Pvt. Ji Su-hyeok is not a matter of personal misfortune, but the clear responsibility of a command culture consumed by performance metrics at the expense of safety," the family added. "We hope the legal proceedings ahead will hold the incompetent commanders and those responsible fully accountable, and that this country never again sees young men who answered the nation's call sacrificed so senselessly."
husn7@heraldcorp.com