Special prosecutor moves to indict ex-NIS deputy chief Hong Jang-won on insurrection charges

The second comprehensive special prosecutor's team — led by Special Prosecutor Kwon Chang-young and tasked with investigating allegations left unresolved after three earlier special counsel probes into insurrection, Kim Keon Hee and the Marine corporal case — has decided to indict Hong Jang-won, former first deputy director of the National Intelligence Service, according to sources familiar with the matter. Hong had been a central figure in exposing the order to arrest politicians following former President Yoon Suk Yeol's declaration of emergency martial law on Dec. 3, 2024, and has since gone from whistleblower to criminal suspect — and now faces becoming a defendant. His legal team recently submitted a statement to the special prosecutor saying the investigation had "selectively picked only unfavorable content and interpreted it out of context."

The special prosecutor's team plans to refer Hong to trial next month on charges of playing a key role in insurrection. The team is moving toward indicting Hong and other NIS officials before it wraps up its work on Aug. 23. Prosecutors are currently categorizing the targets for indictment and the specific charges to be applied. Hong's legal team submitted a written rebuttal denying the charges on Thursday.

Hong is the person who, at around 10:53 p.m. on the night Yoon declared emergency martial law in December 2024, received a direct order from the former president to "round them all up — money, manpower, whatever it takes — support the Defense Counterintelligence Command." He later drew wide attention by publicly disclosing that order. He also revealed that he had heard from former Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyeong a list of politicians to be arrested, including President Lee Jae Myung.

After the special prosecutor's team was launched, however, Hong was booked as a suspect, shifting from a de facto whistleblower to a subject of investigation. He had not been a target during the earlier insurrection special counsel probe led by Special Prosecutor Cho Eun-seok.

According to the special prosecutor's team, Hong is suspected of having directed a foreign-affairs division under his command — acting on orders from then-NIS Director Cho Tae-yong — to convey messages justifying the martial law declaration to the CIA station in South Korea immediately after the declaration. The team also suspects that Hong chaired a division chiefs' meeting shortly after the declaration and established a communications network with the Defense Counterintelligence Command and other agencies.

The special prosecutor's team believes Yoon was at the top of the chain behind the effort to justify the martial law declaration, and that justification messages were relayed to allied nations through the National Security Office, using the NIS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as conduits.

The team believes the National Security Office sent the NIS a request to "explain the background of the emergency martial law to allied nations," along with a hangul-language briefing document, and that a division under Hong's command summoned the CIA station chief in South Korea to NIS headquarters for a briefing in line with that document. The special prosecutor's team's view is that Hong was briefed on and approved every step of the process.

In the third written rebuttal submitted to the special prosecutor's team on Thursday, Hong's legal team said that at around 11:57 p.m. on the night of the emergency martial law declaration, Yoon or the martial law command directly ordered then-NIS Planning and Coordination Bureau chief Kim Nam-woo to carry out martial law duties. The defense argued that Yoon, having concluded his orders were not being followed, attempted to have those duties carried out through Kim — a former subordinate from his days as a prosecutor.

Hong's legal team also emphasized that the "dawn meeting results" document contains the line, "The director said it seems like now would be a good time to do what we have been discussing and thinking about during past Ulchi CPX exercises" — but also states, "However, there were no immediate instructions on what to do right now, and no answers either." The defense said this clearly confirms that the NIS received no orders to immediately carry out specific tasks in response to the martial law declaration.

At a regular briefing on July 20, the special prosecutor's team said Hong had given specific instructions related to the martial law declaration during a division chiefs' meeting under his command — including ordering the establishment of a contact point with the Defense Counterintelligence Command — and that a security division chief had also been directed to set up a contact point with the Korean National Police Agency, adding that the team was monitoring the progress of those instructions.

Regarding this, Hong's legal team said in the written rebuttal that the "241204 meeting minutes" document records the matter as "the issue of dispatching police to the counterterrorism situation room is stalled" — accurately reflecting what Hong had flagged — while the "dawn meeting results" document states "prevention is important, including dispatching staff to the Korean National Police Agency situation room."

The defense argued that "the very fact that two documents recording the same meeting contain contradictory content shows that the documents do not accurately reflect the suspect's original statements, and that even taken at face value, the documents cannot be considered to have evidentiary value sufficient to support a guilty finding."

Hong's legal team said: "In a situation where contradictory content has been confirmed even between two documents recording the same meeting, if the special prosecutor selectively adopts only the content that appears to support the suspected facts while ignoring the contradictory entries, that distorts the overall context."

Above all, Hong's legal team said, "If he had intended to carry out the president's orders and had issued related instructions at the division chiefs' meeting, there is no explanation for why the president immediately dismissed him — unlike other political appointees." The team called on the special prosecutor to drop the charges on grounds of insufficient evidence.

The special prosecutor's team is reportedly investigating a total of nine people connected to the NIS at the time, including Hong and former NIS Director Cho.

According to the special prosecutor's team and Hong's legal team, the sequence of events on the night of the declaration included a political appointees' (command leadership) meeting at around 11:30 p.m., a division chiefs' meeting under Hong's command at around 11:50 p.m., a one-on-one meeting between Hong and former Director Cho at midnight on Dec. 4, 2024, and Hong's departure from the office at around 1:35 a.m. that same day.

The special prosecutor's team has said that after securing and analyzing internal NIS documents, it suspects Hong was involved in the insurrection. The team is reported to have obtained both the "dawn meeting results" and the "241204 meeting minutes" documents. Those documents are understood to contain content discussed at working-level meetings held after the political appointees' meeting — meetings at which Hong's level of seniority was not present.

The special prosecutor's team suspects that Hong, during the emergency martial law, received orders from Yoon or from former NIS Director Cho regarding the arrest of politicians and the blockade of the National Assembly, and that — having recognized and accepted the goal of subverting the constitutional order — he gave specific instructions to division chiefs under his command with the intent of making a material contribution to the use of force.

Specifically, the team believes Hong was involved in issuing instructions related to the Ulchi CPX exercises, establishing contact points with the Defense Counterintelligence Command and the Korean National Police Agency, and directing the CIA station in South Korea to be briefed on the justification for the martial law declaration. In the third written rebuttal, Hong's legal team argued that he had not accepted the goal of subverting the constitutional order before the National Assembly voted to lift the martial law declaration, and that he had not carried out the president's orders.

The special prosecutor's team found that both the "dawn meeting results" and the "241204 meeting minutes" documents contain the line, "The director said it seems like now would be a good time to do what we have been discussing and thinking about during past Ulchi CPX exercises." Based on this, the team believes Hong conveyed to the division chiefs' meeting — held immediately after the political appointees' meeting — that the instruction came from former Director Cho, and either relayed the message to "respond as we would in a Ulchi CPX" or issued orders to take action.

Hong's legal team, however, said at the fourth round of questioning on June 26: "Arrest-related duties fall under the security investigation division beneath the second deputy director, communications and location tracking fall under the third deputy director's division, and financial support falls under the Planning and Coordination Office. A sharing of presidential instructions among all political appointees through a political appointees' meeting, followed by the director's approval or sign-off, would necessarily have to be a prerequisite — but neither information sharing nor division of duties took place."